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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION vs. SENIORITY IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Statement of the Issue

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals created a split among circuits in
determining that seniority policies are but one factor in the undue hardship
analysis of a proposed reasonable accommodation in Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.1
One of the dissenters had this to say about the majority’s opinion:
The sweeping language and exalted tone of the court’s wide-ranging
opinion make clear that it aspires to offer a definitive interpretation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). This might be less disturbing if this
case actually involved an American with a disability. Because the court
reaches out to decide several important issues of first impression in a case
without a proper plaintiff, I must respectfully dissent. . . .2
....
A case so transparently lacking in merit is an inappropriate vehicle for
deciding multiple questions of first impression concerning the proper
construction of an important statute (and creating a circuit split in the
process). . . . The court has issued what in effect amounts to a lengthy advisory
opinion on the ADA . . . .3

Despite the sharp criticism of Justice O’Scannlain’s dissent, the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, made several rulings of first impression regarding Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).4 The U.S. Supreme Court
recently ruled on one of those issues, and that issue is the subject of this

1. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
2. Id. at 1123.
3. Id. at 1124.
4. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000). The
three issues of first impression addressed by the Barnett court were: (1) “the nature and scope of
an employer’s obligation to engage in the interactive process”; (2) “whether reassignment is a
reasonable accommodation in the context of a seniority system”; and (3) “the appropriate
standard for evaluating retaliation claims under the ADA.” Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108.
179
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article.5 The issue, as stated by Petitioner, US Airways, Inc., is “[w]hether the
[ADA] requires an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a position as a
‘reasonable accommodation’ even though another employee is entitled to hold
the position under the employer’s bona fide and established seniority system.”6
Two basic methods of treating seniority policies in relation to the duty to
reasonably accommodate through reassignment developed prior to the
Supreme Court’s ruling on this issue. The majority of courts had held that
reassignment in violation of a bona fide seniority policy is a per se bar to
reassignment being a reasonable accommodation.7 However, there is some
support for a balancing approach like that applied by the Ninth Circuit in
Barnett.8 Despite sharp criticism of its ruling, and subsequent reversal and
remand by the Supreme Court, the majority correctly came to the conclusion
that the balancing approach is the more appropriate resolution of this issue.
Considering the plain language of the ADA, the legislative history of the ADA,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) regulations
under the ADA and public policy, a per se bar is not permissible.
B.

Brief Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act

Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination in the employment sector.9
The general nondiscrimination rule of the ADA reads: “No covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the

5. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
6. Brief for Petitioner at i, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (No. 001250).
7. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 n.9 (citing Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st
Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138
F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996);
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); Willis v. Pac. Maritime
Ass’n, 162 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’d en banc, 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001); Milton v.
Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205
F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000)). The term “bona fide” has been used as a modifier of seniority
policy to indicate that if there is direct proof of an employer seeking a seniority policy in order to
avoid obligations under the ADA, that seniority policy will not be a bar to reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046 n.7. In addition, some courts have
required a “well established” seniority policy, which means if the policy has not been uniformly
followed, the seniority policy will not necessarily bar reassignment in violation of the seniority
policy as a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154,
1176 (10th Cir. 1999).
8. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119-1120. See, e.g., Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F.
Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000). The ADA has four titles. As mentioned, Title I deals
with discrimination in employment. Title II concerns discrimination by public agencies and
public transportation. Id. §§ 12131-12165. Title III addresses private entities that have facilities
open to the public, which must be made accessible to disabled individuals. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
The last title, Title IV, contains miscellaneous provisions. Id. §§ 12201-12213.
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disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”10 The
term “covered entity” applies to employers as well as labor organizations.
Discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity.”11 Restated, a covered entity
is required to provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee
unless such reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship upon
the covered entity.
Reasonable accommodation includes “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.”12 Reassignment to a vacant position indicates, and the legislative
history confirms, that employers are not required to “bump” other employees.13
Under the express language of the ADA, both modifications of existing
policies and reassignment to a vacant position can be reasonable.14 Therefore,
it should follow that modification of the seniority policy to allow a
reassignment is reasonable, unless the position is not “vacant,” or it causes
undue hardship upon the employer. Courts, however, have come to differing
results regarding this issue based on their interpretation of the ADA.
Most courts have reached the conclusion that a per se bar to reassignment
in violation of a bona fide seniority policy is required under the ADA.15 Under

10. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
11. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
12. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
13. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 63 (1989); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d
1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999). The term “bumping” means that an employee currently holds the
position that the disabled employee is seeking as a reasonable accommodation.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“The term reasonable accommodation may include . . .
reassignment to a vacant position [and] . . . appropriate adjustment or modifications of . . .
policies . . . .”).
15. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Davis
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Willis v. Pac. Maritime
Ass’n, 162 F.3d 561 (9th Cir. 1998); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir.
1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130
F.3d 76, 83 (3rd Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996);
Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62
F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)). Generally, these courts have either been the district courts, or
appellate courts reviewing de novo the granting of a summary judgment motion. See, e.g.,
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the per se bar, if the disabled employee seeks reassignment to a position which
a more senior employee has a right to under a bona fide seniority policy,
reassignment is, as a matter of law, not a reasonable accommodation.16
However, some courts, such as Barnett, have applied a balancing approach.17
Under this approach, a seniority policy is but one factor in determining
whether the requested employment action is a reasonable accommodation or
whether it imposes an undue hardship such that the employer need not provide
accommodation.18 The Supreme Court articulated an entirely different rule,
establishing a rebuttable presumption that creating an exception within a
seniority system is unreasonable.19 This could be overcome by the disabled
employee proving special circumstances exist so that creating an exception to
the seniority policy is not unreasonable.20 This approach most closely
resembles a per se bar because the Supreme Court indicated that it would be a
very rare case in which the employee may overcome the presumption of
unreasonableness.
C. Scope and Importance of Issue
The seniority system in Barnett was a policy of US Airways, and not
associated with a collective bargaining agreement negotiated with a union.
This distinction, however, was not a critical factor in the Supreme Court’s
determination of the issue.21 The Supreme Court’s decision, issued on April
29, 2002, will have a significant impact on all seniority systems and on those
policies as a result of disability claims under the ADA. This article will
address both employer created and union negotiated seniority policies.22 The

Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (district court decision);
Eckles, 94 F.3d 1041 (appellate court reviews grant of summary judgment de novo).
16. See, e.g., Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051 (“[W]e conclude that the ADA does not require
disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide
seniority rights of other employees.”).
17. Barnett, 228 F.3d 1105.
18. See, e.g., id. at 1119-1120.
19. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1525 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1524-25. The Court held that seniority systems, whether employer-imposed or
contained within a collective bargaining agreement, create the same expectations for non-disabled
employees. Id.
22. Seniority systems are of great importance in the employment arena. Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976). Seniority is usually awarded according to service time
with the company. An employee who has been employed at the particular employer will have
more seniority than another employer with less service time at that employer. These seniority
policies may give more senior employees preferential treatment in decisions concerning layoff
and recall procedures, promotions, transfers, demotions, shift assignment, preference in
scheduling vacation time, overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and other similar benefits.
Id. at 766-67.
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determination of this issue could also have a significant impact on other
employer-created policies such as mandatory overtime policies or non-transfer
policies. It could also affect analysis of similar provisions in other acts such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23 This article will address these
other possible impacts only peripherally, while focusing on the issue of
accommodating disabled employees in companies with seniority systems.
This Comment will be organized into three additional sections. Section II
will address the Supreme Court’s decision in full, including the concurring and
dissenting opinions.24 Section II will also discuss prior cases that chose either
to adopt a balancing approach or a per se bar. This Comment advocates the
balancing approach adopted in the Ninth Circuit decision in Barnett, which
will be a focus of Section II. Section III will separate and analyze the major
issues that arise when answering this question, and why each supports a
balancing approach or a per se bar. This section will include an analysis of the
ADA and its legislative history, public policy arguments, the problem of
conflict between the ADA and National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”),25
and the appropriateness of resolving this issue through court action as opposed
to legislative action. Finally, Section IV will be a conclusion offering a
summary of the points made and a proposed resolution of this issue.

The Ninth Circuit in Barnett differentiated between cases involving a collective
bargaining agreement, as opposed to a unilaterally imposed employer policy. Barnett, 228 F.3d
at 1120 n.9. The difference lies in the burden it imposes upon other employees. No matter
whether the seniority policy is a result of collective bargaining or employer imposed, expectation
rights of an employee whose seniority rights are displaced are involved. Where there is a
collective bargaining agreement, the contractual rights of the employees affected by a reasonable
accommodation are also involved. This distinction should be considered by the fact finder in
deciding whether a particular accommodation is a “reasonable accommodation.” Emrick v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995). If a collective bargaining
agreement is in effect it will be another factor to consider in the undue hardship analysis, along
with expectations employees have under a seniority policy, whether part of a collective
bargaining agreement or not. Therefore, in either situation the balancing approach should be used
rather than a per se bar to reassignment.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2000).
24. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Stevens and O’Connor both
wrote separate concurrences. Opposing them were a dissent by Justice Scalia, which Justice
Thomas joined, and a dissent by Justice Souter, which Justice Ginsburg joined. US Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (2000).
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II. SUMMARY OF POSITIONS
A.

Factual History of Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.

In Barnett, the plaintiff, Robert Barnett, injured his back while working in
a cargo position for US Airways.26 Upon returning from disability leave,
Barnett realized he could no longer physically perform the functions required
by the cargo position.27 This claim was supported by Barnett’s doctor and
chiropractor, both of whom recommended Barnett avoid heavy lifting and
prolonged periods of bending, twisting, turning, pushing and pulling, and
prolonged periods of sitting and standing.28 Subsequently, Barnett used his
seniority to transfer to a mailroom position, which his doctor had approved.29
After almost two years of service in the mailroom, Barnett became aware that
two employees were going to exercise their seniority rights to obtain positions
in the mailroom.30 After being bumped by these employees, Barnett’s
seniority would only allow him to take a cargo position like the one he had
previously held and could not perform due to his disability.31 Barnett sent a
letter to US Airways requesting that he be allowed to stay in the mailroom as a
reasonable accommodation.32 US Airways did not respond for five months,
but during that period he was allowed to stay in the mailroom.33 After five
months, US Airways informed Barnett that he would not be allowed to stay in
the mailroom position due to the seniority rights of the more senior
employees.34 As an alternative to remaining in the mailroom, Barnett asked
for certain accommodations that would enable him to perform a cargo
position.35 US Airways denied all requested accommodations and proposed
only that Barnett could bid for any job within his restrictions, which did not
provide Barnett any resolution since the only job available would still have

26. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108. What this group of cargo positions entailed was not
elaborated, but for the purposes of this article it is only important that it required heavy lifting that
Mr. Barnett was unable to perform as a result of the back problems he suffered from and that no
accommodation within those positions could be agreed to by Mr. Barnett and US Airways.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The seniority policy of US Airways allowed more senior employees to bump less
senior employees upon application by the more senior employees who wanted to change jobs. Id.
at 1108-09.
30. Id. at 1108-09.
31. Barnett, 228 F.3d. at 1109.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1108-09.
35. Id. at 1109. Mr. Barnett requested a mechanical lifting device or restructuring of the
cargo position as possible accommodations that would allow him to resume work in a cargo
position. Id.
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been the cargo position, which he could not perform without reasonable
accommodation.36
B. Rebuttable Presumption—Supreme Court Resolution of US Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett
Justice Breyer’s opinion started its analysis by reciting the general nondiscrimination rule the ADA creates—”[A]n employer who fails to make
‘reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
[employee] with a disability’ discriminates ‘unless’ the employer ‘can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of [its] business.’”37 Justice Breyer then considered US Airways’
contention that the ADA requires only equal treatment for persons with
disabilities, not preferential treatment.38 Justice Breyer rejected that claim, and
indicated that the ADA does, in fact, require preferential treatment for
individuals with disabilities in the form of reasonable accommodations.39
Justice Breyer went on to add, “the fact that the difference in treatment violates
an employer’s disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation
beyond the [ADA’s] potential reach.”40 Justice Breyer also rejected US
Airways’ argument that, since the seniority system creates rights to all
positions in the company, none of the positions can be considered “vacant,”
and, therefore, reassignment is not required because the ADA prohibits
reassignment to a position that is not vacant.41
Justice Breyer noted that the ADA requires an employee to demonstrate
that reasonable accommodation is possible, and the ADA requires that the
employer is to prove that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
and is, therefore, not required.42 In considering the employee’s required
showing that reasonable accommodation is possible, Justice Breyer stated that
reassignment to a vacant position would normally be reasonable, but for the
seniority system in place.43 He announced that requiring proof that a seniority
system should prevail on a case-by-case basis was not required, because “in the
run of cases” reassignment in violation of a seniority system will be

36. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1109. There was no evidence of whether Barnett was qualified,
without accommodation, to any other position. Id.
37. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1519 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000)).
38. Id. at 1520-21.
39. Id. at 1521.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1521.
42. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1523.
43. Id. at 1523-24.
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unreasonable.44 Justice Breyer noted the following factors as reasons that
varying a seniority system will normally be unreasonable.
First, Justice Breyer cited analogous case law, including decisions under
Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act and several Circuits’ rulings under the ADA.45
According to Justice Breyer, the key to this case was the expectation created
by seniority systems, regardless of whether they are contained within a
collective bargaining agreement or unilaterally imposed by an employer, on
other employees. The opinion indicated that the confusion created by a caseby-case determination would undermine seniority systems and the consistent,
uniform approach they create to assigning employees to positions.46 Justice
Breyer’s rule, however, still requires difficult case-by-case determinations. He
permits an employee to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness by
showing that other employees did not have justified expectations.47 This could
result from such things as an employer reserving the right to change a seniority
system unilaterally, which does, in fact, make many exceptions to the seniority
policy, and, thus, reduces expectations of other employees to the point that
“one further exception is unlikely to matter.”48
Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence to note that a seniority system
is relevant to whether an accommodation is reasonable, but not to whether an
accommodation creates an undue burden as the court of appeals had ruled.49
This is not a critical issue, but it does relate to who carries the burden of proof.
Employees have the burden to prove that reasonable accommodation is
possible; employers carry the burden of proving that a particular
accommodation poses an undue hardship and is, therefore, not required.50 In
the grand scheme of the ADA, this distinction does not matter. Courts can
either rule that the employee has the burden of proving the accommodation is
reasonable, or that the employers must prove the accommodation poses an
undue hardship—as the Supreme Court did in Barnett, ruling that an employee
must prove the accommodation is reasonable.
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurrence to indicate that she would base her
rule in this situation upon whether the seniority system in place creates a
legally enforceable right to a position.51 If it does, then the position is not
vacant, and reassignment to that position could not be a reasonable

44. Id. at 1524.
45. Id. ADA cases relied upon by Justice Breyer included Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180
F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999), Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998),
and Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996). Id.
46. Id. at 1524-25.
47. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1525.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1525-26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 1526.
51. Id. at 1526-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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accommodation.52 Justice O’Connor joined Justice Breyer’s opinion because it
would produce similar results.53
Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which Justice Thomas joined. This dissent
basically announced the unsupported view that the ADA required modification
only to those policies that are disability related.54 Since a seniority policy does
not relate specifically to Barnett’s disability, it cannot be a reasonable
accommodation.55 This Comment will not address this dissent beyond
pointing out a few of its shortcomings. Justice Scalia cited the ADA’s list of
possible accommodations and then proceeded to discuss some of them and
why they supported his proposition that only reasonable accommodations
directed at disability-related obstacles were required.56 He discussed two of
the listed accommodations, “modification of equipment and devises” and
“provisions of qualified readers or interpreters,” which do support his position.
These are accommodations directed to obstacles directly related to an
employee’s disability. However, Justice Scalia conveniently did not discuss
other listed accommodations that did not support his contention, such as
“appropriate adjustment or modification of . . . policies.”57 Another flaw of
Justice Scalia’s opinion was that it cited the EEOC as generally supportive of
his position, when, in fact, the EEOC has explicitly supported a rule that would
permit variance of a seniority policy as a reasonable accommodation.58 Lastly,
Justice Scalia’s opinion indicated that even in a situation where the employer
has created multiple exceptions to the seniority policy, one more exception for
disabled employees would be too burdensome because the other employees
still expect the existing exceptions to be the only exceptions.59 As discussed
later in this article, this is a situation where permitting variance of a seniority
policy would be most justifiable because the other employees’ expectations are
not quite as strong.
Finally, Justice Souter offered a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Ginsburg joined. This dissent supports a balancing approach such as that
supported by this Comment and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case. This
52. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1527.
53. Id. at 1526.
54. Id. at 1528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1529.
56. Id. at 1530 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000)).
57. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1530. Interestingly enough, most courts that have
discussed this issue have overlooked the fact that adjustment or modification of policies is
specifically included in the non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations contained in 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9). This could be because they view reassignment to a vacant position as more
closely analogous to varying a seniority policy.
58. Id. at 1530-31. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Compl. Manual (CCH), No.
915.002, § 902, at 5440 (Mar. 1, 1999) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance].
59. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1531.
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dissent notes that reasonable accommodation can include reassignment to a
vacant position.60 Although many provisions of the ADA have been modeled
after Title VII, the ADA did not include a provision specifically removing
variances in seniority systems from the definition of reasonable
accommodation as Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act did.61 In Justice
Souter’s opinion, this omission created an ambiguity that can be resolved by
the legislative history of the ADA.62 However, Justice Souter’s dissent did
depart from the balancing approach in one significant way. Justice Souter
indicated that the legislative history was not enough to overcome laws that
provided for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.63 It was
enough, however, to indicate that employer-imposed seniority systems, which
do not have special protection by law, cannot be a bar to reasonable
accommodation.64 This was especially true here, where the seniority policy
was contained in an employee handbook that was not intended to create
enforceable contractual rights, and allowed US Airways to change any and all
policies without advanced notice.65 Based on this language, Justice Souter
indicated that Barnett had met his burden by proving that variance in the
seniority policy would be a reasonable accommodation, and the burden,
consequently, was passed to US Airways to prove that this accommodation
would impose an undue hardship.66
C. Ninth Circuit Ruling in Barnett—Judge Fletcher’s Majority Opinion
The majority of the Barnett court considered, among other things, whether
US Airways should be required to make an exception to its company’s
seniority policy in order to accommodate Barnett’s disability. The majority
cited the ADA as explicitly recognizing reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation.67 Then the court narrowed in on the key issues: (1) whether a
disabled employee seeking reassignment as a reasonable accommodation
should be given priority over non-disabled employees seeking the same

60. Id. at 1532.
61. Id. at 1532-33.
62. Id. at 1533 (citing both a House Report and Senate Report indicating that a collective
bargaining agreement is but one factor to consider in reasonable accommodation determinations).
63. Id.
64. US Airways, Inc., 122 S. Ct. at 1533.
65. Id. at 1534.
66. Id.
67. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted,
121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001), rev’d, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002) (“The ADA explicitly states that reasonable
accommodation may include reassignment.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000)). Within
the definition of “reasonable accommodation,” “reassignment to a vacant position” is included.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000).
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position and (2) whether a seniority system was a per se bar to reassignment as
a reasonable accommodation.68
Addressing the first issue, the majority relied upon the EEOC’s guidance
to support the proposition that the ADA does require giving a disabled
employee a reassignment if that person is qualified for the position.69 If this
were not the case, the reassignment requirement “would be of little value and
would not be implemented as Congress intended.”70 The majority then cited
en banc decisions from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the
Tenth Circuit to support the assertion that the ADA requires more from
employers than simply giving disabled employees a chance to compete for
reassignment on an equal basis with non-disabled employees.71
The majority then moved on to the second issue, considering whether an
employer’s unilaterally created seniority policy is a per se bar to reassignment.
The court noted that no other circuit had directly addressed this question.72
After finding the text of the ADA offered no help, the court reviewed the
ADA’s legislative history. The court found no history speaking to seniority
systems outside the collective bargaining context, but did discover that the
available legislative history rejected a per se bar to reassignment in violation of
a seniority policy.73 The legislative history envisioned collective bargaining
agreements containing a provision that allowed employers to take all necessary
steps to comply with the ADA and alert their employees that the seniority
policy may, in certain circumstances, be violated.74
To support their reading of the legislative history, the Barnett majority
again cited the EEOC’s position.75 The EEOC Compliance Manual supports a
fact specific analysis, treating the collective bargaining agreement as another
68. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1117.
69. Id. at 1118 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5456).
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999)).
72. Id. (noting that all other decisions have involved a collective bargaining agreement’s
seniority policy, or simply have been dicta as is the case with Aka, 156 F.3d 1284 and Smith, 180
F.3d 1154).
73. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119 (“The legislative history indicates that a collective bargaining
agreement can be a factor in determining the reasonableness of an accommodation but rejects any
per se bar.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32
(1989))).
74. Id. (“[B]oth reports envision that collective bargaining agreements will incorporate
provisions allowing for compliance with the ADA ‘by ensuring that agreements negotiated after
the effective date of this title contain a provision permitting the employer to take all actions
necessary to comply with this legislation.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63; S. REP.
NO. 101-116, at 32)).
75. Id. (“In the EEOC’s view, such a per se rule nullifies Congress’ intent that undue
hardship always be determined on a case-by-case basis.”) (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 58, at 5463).
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factor in the undue hardship analysis.76 Accordingly, the analysis would start
by examining whether the employer could provide a reasonable
accommodation that would both remove the workplace barrier and not violate
the collective bargaining agreement.77 If such an accommodation was not
possible, the ADA would require the employer and the union, as exclusive
bargaining representative, to engage in good faith negotiation in an effort to
find an agreeable variance in the collective bargaining agreement which would
This
allow the employer to provide a reasonable accommodation.78
accommodation would then be put in place, unless it unduly burdened other
workers’ expectations.79 Relevant factors to consider in determining the undue
burden upon other employees include “the duration and severity of any adverse
effects caused by granting a variance and the number of employees whose
employment opportunities would be affected by the variance.”80
After discussing the EEOC position, the Barnett court reasoned that, in the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement, where no bargained-for rights
were involved, seniority without a showing of undue hardship should not bar
reassignment.81 The Barnett court also recognized other enumerated factors
under the ADA to consider in an undue hardship analysis, “including the cost
of the accommodation, the overall financial resources of the company and the
scope of the employer’s operations.”82 Finally, the court differentiated ADA
cases from Title VII cases because the ADA does not have language protecting
“bona fide seniority systems” as Title VII does.83 The “undue hardship”
requirement under the ADA is “substantially more demanding” than the same
standard in Title VII.84
Concluding that the ADA can require an employer to disregard a bona fide
seniority system, and that such a system is simply one factor in the undue
hardship analysis, the court proceeded to apply the undue hardship analysis to
the situation at hand. The court first looked at the extent of impact on other
76. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463).
77. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463).
78. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1119 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463).
79. Id. (citing at EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463).
80. Id. (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 58, at 5463).
81. Id. (“Here, where there is no collective bargaining agreement, no bargained for rights are
involved. It would seem that the seniority system without more should not bar reassignment.”)
82. Id. at 1120 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000)).
83. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 n.10 (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000)). This
section of Title VII states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
84. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 n.10 (“We note that the ‘undue hardship’ standard in the ADA
is substantially more demanding than the hardship standard in Title VII in the context of
‘reasonable accommodation’ for the religion of employees.”).
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employees if Barnett were allowed to keep his position despite the other
employees’ greater seniority.85 The court expressly noted that reasonable
accommodation does not require the “bumping” of another employee.86 But
the court did not view this employment action as bumping and concluded that
the only adverse effect of accommodation would be the removal of one
position from the seniority bid process.87 In its analysis, the court also
considered the number of ADA claimants employed by US Airways, the
claimants’ seniority levels and the claimants’ need for reasonable
accommodation that violated the seniority policy.88 The court finally held that
US Airways did not present enough evidence to support its claim that
removing one position from the seniority bid process would unduly disrupt the
seniority process.
In Justice O’Scannlain’s dissent, joined by Justices Trott and Kleinfeld, the
main point of contention was that Barnett was not disabled as defined in the
ADA.89 Relying on Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital,90 the dissent refused
to accept a twenty-five pound lifting restriction as substantially limiting the
major life activity of working.91 In order to be disabled within the meaning of
the ADA, an individual must be substantially limited in a “major life
activity.”92 However, the majority in Barnett made a compelling case that this
85. Id. at 1120. The Barnett court viewed the situation at the time of the adverse
employment action, and, therefore, considered Barnett to be the current occupant of the mailroom
position.
86. Id. at 1120. There is disagreement over the meaning of the term “bumping.” Under a
strict interpretation, bumping would mean only taking a position which is currently filled by
another employee. This is the approach adopted by the majority in Barnett. Id. at 1120.
However, other courts have defined it much more broadly. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). The court in Smith held that any position, even if not
currently occupied, is not vacant if another, more senior, employee under a seniority policy has a
right to the position; therefore, any such variation to a seniority policy would require bumping.
Id. at 1175.
87. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120. The court further stated:
Barnett already occupied the mail room position at the time of his request for reasonable
accommodation. Therefore, permanently reassigning Barnett to the mail room position as
a reasonable accommodation did not require “bumping” any other employee from the
position. While this accommodation would eliminate one position from the seniority bid
process, U.S. Air has failed to demonstrate that doing so would cause an undue hardship.
Id.
88. Id. at 1120-21.
89. Id. at 1123.
90. 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1997). For further discussion of this issue, see Lown v. J.J. Eaton
Place, 598 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
91. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1123 (“The similarities between Thompson and the instant case, in
terms of both the plaintiff’s claimed disabilities and the employer’s responses thereto, are
striking. Under Thompson, it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to Barnett’s
disability.”).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
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was not a determinative issue.93 The majority ruled that since U.S. Airways
did not raise the issue as a cross-appeal in its opening or reply brief, the issue
was waived.94 Additionally, Thompson was distinguished because Barnett had
restrictions beyond simply a twenty-five pound lifting restriction.95
Judge Trott wrote a separate dissent to indicate that the majority opinion
leaves employers, employees and lawyers with no guidance and invites
litigation.96 Judge Trott viewed this as a question for Congress to resolve
rather than the courts.97 Judge Trott then reprinted Judge Wiggins’ opinion
from the Ninth Circuit’s original decision in this case, which was subsequently
replaced after the en banc hearing.98 In that opinion, the legislative history of
the ADA was considered ambiguous on the subject. This ambiguity existed
because Judge Wiggins viewed the situation involved in this case as employee
bumping.99 The majority viewed this case differently from bumping because
there were no other options under the seniority system for the disabled
employee.100 Then, based upon that ambiguity, Judge Wiggins relied on cases
from other circuits that held that reasonable accommodation does not require
exempting a disabled employee from a collectively bargained seniority
system.101 Judge Wiggins expressed the view that the ADA, in no way,
requires disabled employees be given preference over non-disabled
employees.102 This conforms to one line of reasoning used by courts to reach
the conclusion that a per se bar should be applied.
D. Cases Addressing the Barnett Decision
Some courts had addressed the issue after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Barnett, but before the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issue. These courts
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach. In a case involving an
employer created seniority policy, EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp.,103 the Fourth
Circuit declined to follow Barnett. In a later Ninth Circuit decision, Willis v.

93. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1111 n.1.
94. Id.
95. Id. (“Barnett faced further restrictions regarding prolonged standing or sitting and
excessive or repeated bending, twisting, turning, stopping, pulling and pushing.”).
96. Id. at 1125 (Trott, J., dissenting) (“I am troubled by the regrettable position in which we
leave employers, employees, and the lawyers who advise them in connection with these important
and possibly costly decisions. To require them to deal with a seniority system as ‘merely one
factor’ leaves them with no guidance, none at all.”).
97. Id. For further discussion of this issue see infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
98. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1125.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1120.
101. Id. at 1125-26.
102. Id. at 1126.
103. 237 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2001).
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Pacific Maritime Association,104 Barnett was distinguished. After discussing
these cases, this article will then discuss one case, Emrick v. Libbey-OwensFord Co.,105 which has adopted a balancing approach like that of Barnett. This
section will then conclude with a discussion of cases which have decided the
issue in favor of a per se bar to modifying seniority policies, as most courts
have.
In Sara Lee, the court was confronted with an employer created seniority
system.106 This case involved an epileptic employee, Vanessa Turpin, who
was only able to work if allowed to remain on the day shift.107 After a plant
closing, as per the seniority system, the displaced employees were able to work
at another plant and displace less senior employees.108 An employee with
twenty years of seniority more than Turpin requested the day shift at the plant
at which Turpin worked and would have displaced Turpin to the second or
third shift, which she was unable to work.109 The company refused her request
to bypass the seniority system, and suggested three options for reasonable
accommodation. All three options were in conformance with the seniority
system, but would not allow Turpin to effectively perform the essential
functions of the job.110
104. 244 F.3d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The original opinion in Willis was
rendered before the en banc hearing of Barnett. See Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n., 162 F.3d 561 (9th
1998). After the Ninth Circuit en banc hearing in Barnett, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, en banc,
the Willis decision and superceded the first Willis decision. 244 F.3d 675. In that decision, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Barnett based on the fact that the seniority policy in Willis was
contained within a collective bargaining agreement, as opposed to being unilaterally implemented
by the employer. Willis, 244 F.3d at 680-81.
105. 875 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
decision held that a seniority policy, whether within a collective bargaining agreement or not, is
only one factor in determining the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation under the ADA.
The district court found no prior case to have decided on the issue in this opinion handed down on
February 8, 1995. Id. at 396.
106. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 351.
107. Id. Ms. Turpin, despite taking medication and seeing a neurologist, suffered occasional
seizures. The worst of these seizures would occur nocturnally. The nocturnal seizures would
cause shaking, kicking, salivating, and, at least once, bedwetting. After the nocturnal seizures,
Ms. Turpin would often be left bruised, exhausted and unrested. Some of the daytime seizures
had occurred while Ms. Turpin was working. She could feel the seizures coming on, and sit
elsewhere until the seizure would end. After the seizure she was able to return to what she had
been previously doing. Id. at 350-51.
108. Id. at 351. Ms. Turpin worked at Sara Lee’s Florence, South Carolina plant. When the
Hartsville, South Carolina plant closed, under Sara Lee’s internal seniority policy, the displaced
employees could use their seniority to replace less senior employees at other plants. One of the
employees from the Hartsville plant requested Ms. Turpin’s position, had twenty more years
seniority than did Turpin, and so had a right to the position under the seniority policy. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Sara Lee “gave Turpin three options, all based upon the seniority policy: 1) move to
the second or third shift; 2) go on layoff status with recall rights for twelve months (including the
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The court started its analysis by citing the ADA’s requirement that an
employer is required to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee, unless
it was shown to be an undue hardship.111 The court also found that the
reasonable accommodation requirement, beyond not imposing an undue
hardship, had to be “reasonable.”112 The court recognized the weight of
authority holding that an employer need not violate a non-discriminatory
policy as a reasonable accommodation.113 The court next announced that a
seniority policy is the perfect example of a policy to which the employer is
entitled to respect.114 The court recognized the fact in this case, which most
other cases did not have to consider, that Turpin was requesting to stay in her
position, not to displace another worker who had greater seniority. However,
without analysis, the court stated that “[t]his is a distinction without a
difference.”115 The court made no attempt to consider what effect allowing
Turpin to remain in her position would produce.116 The court simply reasoned
that requiring Sara Lee to bypass the seniority system would expose it to
litigation from any employees who were not given the benefit they expected
under the seniority system.117 The court finished by stating a reasonable
accommodation requiring variance to a seniority policy would make the ADA
into a mandatory preference statute, rather than an anti-discrimination statute
as it is meant to be.118
right to be recalled to a first shift position should one become available); or 3) take a severance
package.” Id.
111. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 353.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 353 (“Virtually all circuits that have considered the issue have held the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation standard does not require an employer to abandon a legitimate and
non-discriminatory company policy.”).
114. Id. at 354 (“Although the ADA allows an employee to transfer to a vacant position,
Turpin has no statutory right to supercede Sara Lee’s seniority system.”).
115. Id.
116. Presumably the employee with twenty years experience requesting the day shift is not
the one who will be affected, but rather the person with the next lowest seniority to Turpin. This
is because of the “trickle down” effect of seniority policies. The more senior employee, not being
able to replace the disabled employee, will take the next best position, displacing a less senior
employee. This less senior employee could then displace an employee with lower seniority, and
down the line until the employee actually displaced has seniority similar to or worse than the
disabled employee. This trickle down effect would lessen the individual burden since the
displaced employee was actually one with slightly more seniority than the employee who is most
effected. Also, there are other situations that would illustrate why the effect on other employees
may not be so serious. For example, requiring an employee to take the second or third shift after
transferring to a different plant would be less of a burden than if the employee had no job
available at all.
117. Sara Lee, 237 F.3d at 355. For a discussion of why this argument is unpersuasive, see
infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
118. Id. (citing Dalton v. Suburu-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 679, 679 (7th Cir. 1998) (A
“contrary rule would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a
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The Ninth Circuit distinguished Willis v. Pacific Maritime Association
from Barnett because it involved a seniority policy created by a collective
bargaining agreement instead of an employer-established seniority system.119
The court in Willis stated that before the undue hardship analysis, it must first
determine whether violating a collective bargaining agreement’s seniority
system is an undue hardship per se or just a factor in the balancing analysis
under the undue hardship standard.120 Willis cited eight circuits which have
followed the per se bar,121 and noted that only one district court and several
commentators suggested using the balancing approach.122 The court found that
the collective bargaining agreement seniority system consisted of bargainedfor, contractual rights of other employees. Thus, any request to bypass that
system would be unreasonable, and it could not be evaluated through an undue
hardship balancing test.123 The court then addressed the legislative history of
the ADA suggesting a balancing approach rather than a per se bar.124 Despite
this, the court rejected the balancing approach because Congress was fully
aware of the “well-established precedent” which refused to require employers
to violate a collective bargaining agreement’s bona fide seniority policy under
Rehabilitation Act cases at the time the ADA was enacted.125 Moreover,
Congress did not expressly rebut a per se bar within the language of the
ADA.126 The court then announced that sound public policy supports a per se

result which would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an
unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees.”)).
119. Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
120. Id. at 680.
121. Id. (citing Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000);
Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138
F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 81-83 (3d Cir. 1997); Foreman v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d
1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.
1995); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995)).
122. Id. (citing Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex.
1995); William J. McDevitt, Seniority Systems and the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Fate
of “Reasonable Accommodation” After Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359 (1997); Eric H.J.
Stahlhut, Playing the Trump Card: May An Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate Under
the ADA by Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 LAB. LAW. 71 (1993); Robert A.
Dubault, The ADA and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271
(1995)).
123. Id. at 681.
124. Willis, 244 F.3d at 681 (“We acknowledge that some of the legislative history suggests a
balancing approach.”).
125. Id. at 681 (“However, we, like our sister circuits which have confronted the issue, must
also recognize that Congress enacted the ADA fully aware of the ‘well established precedent’
under the Rehabilitation Act . . . and yet failed to include any provision to counter that
precedent . . .”).
126. Id.
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bar,127 because a balancing approach would place the employers in a situation
where they had to guess whether a specific request was a reasonable
accommodation.128 This guess would then put the employer in danger of
violating the ADA, on the one hand, and the NLRA, on the other hand, for any
employees who were bumped.129 In certain instances, the terms of the
collectively bargained seniority policy are flexible enough to permit an
accommodation of a less senior employee. The court in Willis did not rule on
the question of whether such an accommodation could be required under the
ADA.130 The court also defined “bona fide seniority system” as one created
for legitimate purposes, and not for discriminatory purposes, and would allow
a plaintiff to argue that the seniority system was not bona fide.131
E.

Support for a Balancing Approach

Similar to Barnett, the court in Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford favored a
rule in support of allowing such variation to a seniority policy depending on
the results of a balancing test.132 In Emrick, the court first looked to decisions
under the Rehabilitation Act, which are persuasive authority under the ADA.133
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the generally accepted notion was that
reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement or seniority
policy was per se unreasonable.134 The Supreme Court concluded that the
routine operation of a bona fide seniority system does not infringe upon an

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Willis, 244 F.3d at 681-82 (“We are persuaded that it would be improper to subject an
employer to the Hobson’s choice of violating the ADA or the NLRA, or at least subjecting itself
to the threat of litigation under these statutes, depending on the outcome of a ‘balancing’
approach.”). For a discussion of why this argument is unpersuasive, see infra notes 227-33 and
accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 682 (“Our decision does not preclude an employee from arguing that a proposed
accommodation is reasonable despite a conflict with a [collective bargaining agreement]
provision that does not contain a bona fide seniority system.”).
132. Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 396-97 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
133. Id. at 395. Congress apparently borrowed the term “reasonable accommodation” from
the EEOC regulations issued in implementing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and, for this reason,
cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are considered to be guidance on this issue. Eckles v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996).
134. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 395 (citing Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467-68 (4th Cir.
1987); Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1251 (6th Cir. 1985); Daubert v.
United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1368-72 (10th Cir. 1984); Florence v. Frank, 774 F.
Supp. 1054, 1062 (N.D. Tex. 1991)); see also Rose Daly-Rooney, Note, Reconciling Conflicts
Between the Americans With Disabilities Act and The National Labor Relations Act To
Accommodate People With Disabilities, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 387, 394-95 (1994).
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employee’s rights under the Rehabilitation Act.135 The court ruled that
disrupting an employee’s expectations under a seniority policy would “greatly
disrupt a settled and worked-for reliance on valid interests and
expectations . . . .”136 Therefore, seniority rights should be given special
weight to create a balance between the interests of the disabled employees in
not being discriminated against and the non-disabled employees rights under
the collective bargaining agreement.137
The Emrick court then sought guidance from the legislative history of the
ADA. The court concluded that an employer cannot use a collective
bargaining agreement to do what is otherwise forbidden under the Act.138
Additionally, the court in Emrick pointed out that the list of reasonable
accommodations in the ADA specifically includes reassignment. Emrick also
cited two commentators who have agreed that seniority should be a factor in
the analysis of undue hardship and that a per se rule is inappropriate.139
Recognition was made that the ADA does not require the employer bump
another employee in order to create a vacancy.140 The court concluded this
discussion by stating that the ADA requires assurance of equality for disabled
employees, and not preference over other employees.141
In addition to Emrick and Barnett, two other courts have indicated support
for the balancing approach without actually making a determination of the
issue. In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center, the court stated in dicta that
collective bargaining agreements should be read consistent with federal law
and that the court was “skeptical” of whether a collective bargaining agreement
could waive individual rights granted by the ADA.142 Citing Barnett, the court
in Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank proposed that a disabled employee is to receive
preferential treatment over non-disabled employees in reassignment

135. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 396 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
78-80 (1977); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 900-13 (1989)).
136. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 396.
137. Id. (“[T]o alter entitlements under a valid seniority system can greatly disrupt a settled
and worked-for reliance on valid interests and expectations of many innocent workers.”) (citing
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 904-09)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Joanne Jocha Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 1991 DET. C. L. REV. 925
(1991); Daly-Rooney, supra note 134). See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
140. Emrick, 875 F. Supp. at 397.
141. Id. at 398.
142. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1303 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating the
employer “would thus effectively be claiming that the [collective bargaining agreement] waives
[the disabled employee’s] ADA rights. Although we need not decide now whether such waivers
are permissible, we are skeptical.”).
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decisions.143 Both of these decisions, however, do not necessarily show a
preference for a balancing approach, but rather a general disagreement with a
per se bar. Additionally, the decisions simply make a statement without any
analysis beyond recognition of prior persuasive precedent. As a result, these
decisions do not possess a great deal of persuasive force, but they do indicate
that some courts are willing to support an approach other than a per se bar to
reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. However,
irrespective of the cases discussed in this section, a great majority of courts
favor a per se bar to reassignment in violation of a seniority policy.
F.

Courts Adopting a Per Se Bar144

In addressing whether employers are required to allow a variance in a
collective bargaining agreement seniority policy, most circuits have adopted a
per se bar.145 The reasoning throughout these circuits is generally very similar,
and these courts have been increasingly ready to adopt the easy-to-apply per se
bar in alignment with prior persuasive predecent, and not a balancing
approach.
In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of which test to apply.146 The court in Eckles discussed the undue
143. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 55, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]hen
reassignment of an existing employee is the issue, the disabled employee is entitled to preferential
consideration.”).
144. The per se bar is generally subject to certain exceptions. The main exception is for
seniority provisions drafted with the intent to discriminate against disabled employees. See, e.g.,
Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Courts will term the per
se bar applying to “bona fide” or “legitimate” seniority policies. See, e.g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he collective bargaining agreement at issue did
not subject [disabled employees] to prohibited discrimination by establishing a bona fide seniority
system that regulates the holding of positions at Conrail.”); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d
349, 353-54 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[R]easonable accommodation standard does not require an
employer to abandon a legitimate and non-discriminatory company policy.”). “A ‘bona fide’
seniority system is one that was created for legitimate purposes, rather than for the purpose of
discrimination.” Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1046 n.7. Another exception often stated involves situations
where the policy is not “well-established,” meaning the policy has not been followed strictly in
the past so that employees do not have legitimate expectations created from the policy. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999).
145. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Davis
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000); Willis, 162 F.3d at 561;
Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138
F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997); Eckles, 94 F.3d
at 1051; Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Benson v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995)).
146. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1045-46. This case actually involved a situation in which the
collective bargaining agreement allowed a more senior employee to be bumped by written
agreement by the union and the employer. Eckles was allowed to bump a more senior employee
because the union and employer made an agreement. Id. at 1044. Later the union rescinded its
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hardship analysis, and pointed out that seniority systems pose a conflict
between the disabled employee and his or her co-workers rather than the
employer.147 Furthermore, the court found that an employer cannot use a
contractual obligation to avoid an obligation imposed by the ADA.148
However, in Eckles, this same challenge was dismissed because the plaintiff
offered no evidence that the employer enacted the seniority system to bypass
its obligations under the ADA.149 The court also relied on the definition of
reasonable accommodation for guidance. The tribunal found it significant that
reassignment to a vacant position was included.150 By including the word
“vacant,” it can be inferred that Congress did not intend other employees to be
pushed from their positions to accommodate a disabled employee.151
The Eckles court, however, found the express language of the ADA
somewhat ambiguous.152 For this reason, the court reviewed the history of the
term “reasonable accommodation” as applied under the ADA. It found that
Congress borrowed the term from the regulations issued by the EEOC during
its implementation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.153 Because of the
presence of these regulations, cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act were
considered to be guidance on the issue.154 Those cases rejected the notion that
employers should violate a seniority system as a reasonable accommodation
under the Rehabilitation Act and a virtual per se rule developed.155 Because of
this “well-established precedent,” Congress drafted the ADA with knowledge
that the Rehabilitation Act had a per se bar to reassignment in violation of a

agreement with the employer and a more senior employee was allowed to bump Eckles. Id. This
resulted in Eckles having to take involuntary sick leave until he was able to find a job that he
could perform and had seniority for. Id. Eckles then had a seizure and had to take involuntary
sick leave; upon returning, the employer forced him to find a new position. Id. Eckles was able
to successfully bid for a new job, but was still not protected from a more senior employee
bumping him. Id.
147. Id. at 1045-46.
148. Id. at 1046.
149. Id. (“Eckles does not claim that the seniority system was established, even in part, in
order to bypass the duty to accommodate under the ADA; and there is no evidence of such
subterfuge.”).
150. Id. at 1047.
151. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1047.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The per se bar to violating a seniority system was subject to a requirement that the
system be bona fide or non-discriminatory in civil rights cases under Title VII and the
Rehabilitation Act. Most courts currently maintain this requirement. Some have stated this
requirement by prohibiting negotiation of seniority provisions with “actual intent to
discriminate . . . on the part of those who negotiated or maintained the [seniority] system.”
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982).
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seniority system.156 The court also noted that Title VII did not require
violation of otherwise valid agreements such as the collectively bargained
seniority rights of other employees.157 The court then reviewed the legislative
history and also found it somewhat ambiguous, but, in general, more
supportive of not requiring deviation from a seniority policy to provide a
disabled employee a reasonable accommodation.158 The court recognized the
decision in Emrick, but refused to accept its reasoning and conclusion that a
balancing test should be applied.159 The court concluded that “the ADA does
not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the
collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.”160 The
court pointed to other decisions coming to this conclusion as well.161
The Tenth Circuit reached the same result in Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc.,
but the court tackled this issue in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement in a slightly different way.162 The Smith court based its decision on
the phrase “reassignment to a vacant position.”163 It found that this express
language of the ADA did not allow bumping another employee in order to
reassign a disabled employee. The court reasoned that a position is not really
vacant, even if not currently occupied, if another employee has a right to it
under the seniority system.164 Since greater seniority meant that an employee
has a right to the position, a disabled employee could not require the employer
to violate the seniority system as a reasonable accommodation.165 While Smith
did not adopt a per se bar to such reasonable accommodation, it came very
close. The Smith court stated that a seniority policy could be violated, but only
if it was not so well entrenched or so well established that it gave legitimate
expectations of a job to a more senior employee.166 This approach, while
better than a per se bar, was limited only to circumstances in which an

156. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1048.
157. Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977)).
158. Id. at 1049.
159. Id. at 1050 n.15 (indicating also that Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695 (5th Cir.
1995), a subsequent decision in the same district, had already questioned the continued
application of Emrick).
160. Id. at 1051.
161. Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051 (listing Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114
(8th Cir. 1995); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995); Milton v. Scrivner,
Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995); Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th
Cir. 1995)).
162. 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-76 (10th Cir. 1999).
163. Id. at 1174-75. The term “reassignment to a vacant position” is one of the examples of
possible reasonable accommodations set out in the definition of “reasonable accommodation” in
the ADA. See infra text accompanying note 181; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000).
164. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1175.
165. Id. at 1175-76.
166. Id. at 1176.
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employer has a history of granting variations in the seniority policy. Where a
union-negotiated seniority policy is in place, this will almost assuredly never
occur. Therefore, this possible exception will apply only to employer-created
seniority systems, and only if the employer regularly grants variations in the
policy. The significance of this decision is not this limited exception, but the
reasoning used to reach the court’s conclusion.
Two general lines of reasoning have developed for not requiring employers
to violate a collectively bargained for seniority provision. The first is the view
that no position is vacant if there is a more senior employee who desires the
position. Therefore, according to the express language of the ADA, an
employer is not required to give a disabled employee a position over a more
senior employee. The second rationale comes to the same conclusion, but
through a review of prior precedent, the express language of the ADA, the
legislative history of the ADA, the rights of other employees and public policy.
While this is the more universally accepted reasoning for protecting seniority
policies, seniority policies are better balanced with other factors in determining
whether the requested employment action is a reasonable accommodation or an
undue hardship.
III. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE ISSUES
A.

Prior Persuasive Precedent

The most prevalent argument against reassigning a disabled employee in
violation of a seniority policy is precedent. Many courts have simply adopted
the rule as it applies to collective bargaining agreements without analysis of
the underlying issues.167 On the other hand, some courts have adopted the per
se bar based on precedent, but then discussed some particular aspect of the
underlying issues. For example, in Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., the
court cited a long line of precedent and then discussed in a footnote the
adoption by the EEOC of a balancing approach.168 The court rejected the
EEOC approach because it viewed the guidance as inconsistent with the ADA
and with other courts’ previous reasoning on the issue.
In EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., the court concluded that the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement should not be violated and went on to state
that “[a] seniority system provides a prime example of a policy that a company

167. See Cameron v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048 n.8 (N.D. Ill.
1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); Cochrum v. Old Ben
Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 912-13 (7th Cir. 1996); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st
Cir. 1998); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997); Kralik v.
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1997); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.
1995).
168. 205 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2000).
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is entitled to respect.”169 The court discussed the effect of a violation on other
employees and held that the unwanted related effect was the key to why a
company cannot be required to violate the terms of a seniority policy.170 The
court emphasized that other civil rights laws imposed costs on employers only
and not on co-employees of the protected employee.171 A “contrary rule would
convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a
result which would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the
ADA and an unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of
disabled employees.”172
Although most courts had stated their holdings in terms of a seniority
provision of a collective bargaining agreement without discussing the impact,
if any, of an employer-created seniority provision outside a collective
bargaining agreement, the Sara Lee court specifically stated that the source of
the provision made no difference.173 Since the Supreme Court has issued its
ruling in Barnett, there is controlling precedent that both sources should be
treated similarly.
B.

Plain Language of the ADA

In its statement of findings for the ADA, Congress stated that “the Nation’s
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals” and that, “the continuing existence of unfair
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities
the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities
for which our free society is justifiably famous.”174 In order to carry out
enforcement of the ADA to ensure that these findings are addressed, a flexible,
workable standard for the many different situations that arise under the ADA
must be applied.175

169. 237 F.3d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 2001).
170. Id. at 354-55.
171. Id. (“All antidiscrimination statutes, from Title VII to the ADA, impose costs on
employers. . . . The difference in this case is that requiring an employer to break a legitimate and
non-discriminatory policy tramples on the rights of other employees as well.”).
172. Id. at 355 (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir.
1998)).
173. Id. (“No reason exists for creating a different rule for legitimate and non-discriminatory
policies that are not a part of a collective bargaining agreement. All workers—not just those
covered by collective bargaining agreements—rely upon established company policies.”).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)-(9) (2000).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (2001) (EEOC Interpretive Guidance) (“[T]he employer must
make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate
reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves
both the employer and the [employee] with a disability.”).
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Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination in the employment sector.176
The general nondiscrimination rule of the ADA states that “[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”177 A
covered entity is defined as “an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee.”178 Accordingly, both
employers and labor unions are prohibited from discriminating under Title I of
the ADA. Discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity.”179 A “qualified
individual with a disability” is defined as “an individual with a disability who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”180
Restated, a covered entity is not required to provide reasonable
accommodation to a disabled employee if such reasonable accommodation
would impose an undue hardship.
Reasonable accommodation includes “job restructuring, part-time or
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations.”181 Two of these
reasonable accommodations are pertinent to the present analysis,
“reassignment to a vacant position” and “appropriate adjustment or
modifications of . . . policies.”
Reassignment to a vacant position indicates, and the legislative history
confirms, that employers are not required to “bump” other employees.182 As
discussed previously, what the term “vacant” means has been a key factor in
some cases calling for a per se bar to variation of a seniority policy.183 In
Eckles, the seniority policy allowed for more senior employees, if qualified, to
bid on and receive a job even if a less senior employee already held that job.184
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (2000).
Id. § 12112(a).
Id. § 12111(2).
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Id. § 12111(8).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id.
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The less senior employee would then have to bid for another job in which the
employee was qualified and had greater seniority than the person that currently
held the job.185 In this context, the court ruled that no position is vacant if
there is a more senior, qualified employee because of the ability to bid for and
receive any job held by a less senior employee.186 This is one of the
ambiguities in the ADA. Other courts have held that “vacant” would include
any job not currently filled by an employee.187
Appropriate adjustment or modification of policies as a reasonable
accommodation is another somewhat ambiguous term in the ADA, which is a
result of the ADA’s breadth. This concept has not been applied in decisions
regarding whether an employer must violate a seniority system to reassign an
employee as a reasonable accommodation. Presumably, this is because
“reassignment to a vacant position” has been viewed as more on point with
regard to this issue, since reassignment is the action to be taken. Comparing
these two possible accommodations, the key term is “vacant.” Under the
express language of the ADA, both modifications of existing policies and
reassignment to a vacant position can be reasonable.188 Therefore, it follows
that modification of a seniority policy to allow reassignment can be reasonable
if the position is vacant, and if it does not cause undue hardship. In light of
this somewhat ambiguous language, it is necessary to consider whether the
legislative history of this Act supports a reading that allows reassignment in
violation of a seniority policy.
C. Legislative History
Both the House and the Senate Reports contain language to the effect that
seniority policies are but one factor in determining whether an accommodation
of a disabled employee would be a reasonable accommodation.189 Despite this
language, courts have ruled seniority policies to be a per se bar to this sort of
accommodation.190 Courts have focused on “well established precedent” that
the Rehabilitation Act does not require violation of a “bona fide seniority
185. Id.
186. Id. (“We also acknowledge that under a seniority system like that in place . . . [here], few
positions are ever truly ‘vacant,’ in the sense of being unfilled.”).
187. See supra text accompanying note 164.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000). Both terms are included within a list of possible
reasonable accommodations contained in the definition of “reasonable accommodation.” Id.
189. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989). The
House Report stated:
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to
the job. However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63.
190. See, e.g., Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001).
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system” and reasoned that had Congress intended to change this rule, it would
have been explicitly stated in the language of the ADA.191 As discussed above,
however, the ADA does include language providing that reasonable
accommodation may include “modifying . . . policies.”192
Requiring employers and unions to grant variations in seniority policies is
consistent with the approach envisioned by the drafters of the ADA. The
drafters were concerned with the wide spread unemployment of disabled
Americans resulting in the poverty of these individuals.193 Reviewing a Lou
Harris poll, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources recognized
that two-thirds of working-age Americans with disabilities were not working
despite sixty-six percent of these individuals preferring to work.194 In
“absolute terms, this means that about 8.2 million people with disabilities want
to work but cannot find a job.”195 This was costing taxpayers billions of
dollars annually in support payments and lost income tax revenue and kept
disabled Americans from becoming self-reliant, leaving them in unjust,
unwanted dependency.196 These concerns would be better addressed through a
flexible, case-by-case assessment of whether a violation of another employee’s
seniority rights would be a reasonable accommodation or whether it would
present an undue hardship for the employer or the labor union.
This flexible approach is adopted in the legislative history of the ADA.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated that “the
decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one of which
must be determined based on the particular facts of the individual case.”197 A
“fact-specific case-by-case approach to providing reasonable accommodation
is generally consistent with the interpretations of [reasonable accommodation]

191. See, e.g., id. at 681. The Willis court stated:
However, we, like our sister circuits which have confronted the issue, must also recognize
that Congress enacted the ADA fully aware of the “well established precedent” under the
Rehabilitation Act which refused to require employers to violate a [collective bargaining
agreement’s] bona fide seniority system, and yet failed to include any provision to the
counter that precedent in the plain language of the ADA.
Id. (citation omitted).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000).
193. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 9 (1989) (submitted by the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources) (“Individuals with disabilities experience staggering levels of unemployment and
poverty.”).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 17 (“President Bush has stated: ‘On the cost side, the national Counsel on the
Handicapped states that current spending on disability benefits and programs exceeds $60 billion
annually.’”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43 (1990) (submitted by the House Committee on
Education and Labor) (finding “that discrimination results in dependency on social welfare
programs that cost taxpayers unnecessary billions of dollars each year”).
197. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 31 (1989).
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under sections 501, 503, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.”198 This
flexible approach was also endorsed by the House Committee on the
Judiciary,199 and is a well-recognized guide to making determinations of
whether a particular accommodation poses an undue hardship.200 This
approach is consistent with the concepts of reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship as espoused throughout the ADA’s legislative history.
Reasonable accommodation “incorporates a range of actions that may be
necessary to allow a person with a disability to perform the essential functions
of a job,”201 and is a key requirement of the ADA.202 The House Committee
on Education and Labor envisioned a process that starts with identification of
possible accommodations through discussion with the disabled employee and
any other information source.203 After possible accommodations are identified,
then the accommodation should be “assess[ed] . . . [for] effectiveness and
equal opportunity.”204 The accommodation must be effective for the employee
and be considered for reliability and how timely it may be implemented.205
The Committee went on to indicate its support for the proposition “that a
reasonable accommodation should provide a meaningful equal employment
opportunity,” meaning that it would give disabled employees an opportunity to
reach a level of performance comparable to that of a non-disabled employee.206
If two or more effective reasonable accommodations are available, the

198. Id.
199. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41 (1990). The Committee felt that a listing of factors
to be considered in reasonable accommodation determinations as to undue hardship was more
appropriate than a proposal which would have set an arbitrary ceiling on cost of accommodation
compared to salary of the employee. Id. The rejected proposal called for a fixed limit of over ten
percent of the disabled employee’s salary as per se undue hardship. Id.
200. See 1 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
104.030 (William A. Hancock ed., 1999) [hereinafter CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE]. See also
2 BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES §
22:20 (1992); AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE § 3.9 (Robert A. Maroldo ed., 1992).
201. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 34 (1990).
202. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 33 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990)
(“This reasonable accommodation requirement is central to the non-discrimination mandate of the
ADA.”); 135 CONG. REC. S4993 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (remarks of Senator Kennedy stating
“[t]he removal of physical barriers and access to reasonable accommodations are among the most
essential elements of this measure”).
203. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 66 (1990) (“[T]he search for possible accommodations
must begin with consulting the individual with a disability. Other resources to consult include the
appropriate State Vocational Rehabilitation Services agency, the Job Accommodations Network
operated by the President’s Committee on Employment of People With Disabilities, or other
employers.”).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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employer is permitted to choose the least costly or more easily implemented
one as long as the accommodation does, indeed, provide a meaningful equal
employment opportunity to the disabled employee.207 Still remaining is the
requirement that the accommodation not impose an undue hardship.
Throughout the drafting of the ADA, undue hardship was defined in
flexible terms, with no specific conditions. The concept of undue hardship has
been stated as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense i.e., an
action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that will
fundamentally alter the nature of the program.”208 The term “undue hardship”
was included for two reasons.209 First, it was intended to distinguish it from
the definition of “readily achievable” under Title III regarding the requirement
of alteration of public buildings to allow access to disabled people.210 Second,
the undue hardship burden “creates a more substantial obligation on the
employer.”211 The term undue hardship requires a significant obligation on the
employer’s part, rather than simply an insignificant or de minimis
obligation.212
Some courts have placed too much reliance on the precedent under the
Rehabilitation Act that concluded seniority systems were not to be violated.
However, the ADA’s legislative history specifically includes modifying
policies and contains language indicating a seniority system is but one factor in
an undue hardship determination.213 In order to encourage employment among
a minority of Americans who faced serious unemployment and dependency,
Congress enacted the ADA, which requires reasonable accommodation to the
known limitations of disabled employees.214 Congress intended the process of
finding a reasonable accommodation to be flexible in order to meet the
requirements of the employee, while not imposing an undue hardship on the
employer. Congress recognized that every employer is different, and,
therefore, envisioned a case-by-case approach to determining whether an
accommodation poses such an undue hardship.

207. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990).
208. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989).
209. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989). The
House Report stated:
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to
the job. However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000).
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In fact, Congress considered the risk to employers of not having clearly
defined standards on which to base their decisions and responded by creating a
progressive system under the ADA to identify reasonable accommodations.
The employer must first determine whether an accommodation exists that
would enable an employee to perform the essential functions of that
employee’s current position.215 Therefore, if an accommodation may be found
in an employee’s current position, the risk that other employees’ seniority
rights will be infringed is reduced.216 If an accommodation may not be found
in the employee’s current position, then the employer must look to other
possible accommodations, one of which could require variation of the seniority
policy.217 However, if more than one effective reasonable accommodation can
be identified, the employer may choose between the two.218 This allows an
employer to avoid variation of the seniority policy if another effective
accommodation exists. An employer is also not required to implement an
accommodation that imposes an undue hardship on the employer; thus, if
varying the seniority system would result in undue hardship, the employer may
avoid such a variation.219 Despite possible uncertainty in results, which could
lead to increased litigation costs, an employer has other protections for this
problem, as will be later discussed. Reading the ADA in such a way to allow
variation of a seniority policy not only promotes the basic purpose of the
legislation, but it also affords protections for employers such that a variance of
a seniority policy likely not impose an undue burden upon them.
D. Other Employees’ Rights
Some courts have suggested that seniority systems may be so “well
entrenched,” whether contained within a collective bargaining agreement or
not, that other, more senior employees have a legitimate expectation to a job.220
Where this is so, requiring an employer to disrupt and violate these legitimate
expectations would “constitute a fundamental and unreasonable alteration in
the nature of the employer’s business.”221 As the legislative history also
indicates, Congress desired to have other employees’ expectations under a
seniority provision to be a factor in the undue hardship analysis.222

215. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 200, at § 3.10(5).
216. This risk is not completely eliminated due to many seniority clauses allowing employees
with higher seniority to “bump” lower ranking employees.
217. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETATIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 200, at § 3.10(5).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1176 (10th Cir. 1999).
221. Id.
222. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990). This Report stated:
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An employer may prove hardship based on the effects on coworkers of a
variation in a seniority policy, but it is uncertain what types of impact on
coworkers would be considered as undue hardship.223 One court suggested
that “[w]hat would be lost to the other employees, particularly more senior
employees, would be some of the value of their seniority within the company,
not their employment.”224 Under an undue hardship analysis, as the
discriminatory effect on other employees increases, the more likely it is that a
court will find the accommodation imposes an undue hardship and is,
therefore, not required. Thus, balancing the need for an accommodation
against the undue hardship it could impose will protect the other employees’
legitimate rights, while protecting the rights of disabled employees under the
ADA at the same time.225
Some courts and commentators have distinguished seniority provisions
contained in collective bargaining agreements from those not contained within
a collective bargaining agreement. The distinction is one of degree. Under a
collective bargaining agreement, the seniority rights are part of an explicit
employment contract, whereas, without a collective bargaining agreement, the
seniority rights of employees give rise to expectations under an employer’s
policy. Under a balancing test of undue hardship, this would result in a greater
likelihood that collectively bargained seniority rights would carry more weight
than seniority policies imposed by the employer, but not contained within a
collective bargaining agreement. In this way, both the rights of disabled
employees and the rights of non-disabled employees may be considered and
balanced in order to maximize the result for all involved. An even better
resolution of this issue would be for the employer to condition application of
the seniority system on any conflicting ADA requirements. This would then
reduce the expectancy interests of the non-disabled employees.
E.

Public Policy

Two main policy arguments must be considered. First, opponents of a
balancing test argue that it is unfair to subject employers to litigation costs
under either the NLRA or ADA based on the decision they make. This
problem would occur where an employer makes a reasonable accommodation
in violation of a seniority policy and the displaced employee brings a claim
under the NLRA resulting from the employer’s violation of the collective
[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with a given
amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a
reasonable accommodation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to
the job. However, that agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
Id.
223. See Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996).
224. Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 1996).
225. See Daly-Rooney, supra note 134, at 398.
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bargaining agreement. However, if the employer refuses to make such
reasonable accommodation in violation of the seniority policy, the disabled
employee could bring a claim under the ADA. In this way, the employer could
face litigation no matter which choice it makes. Second, proponents of the
balancing test argue against the ability of employers to avoid the duties
imposed by the ADA by either negotiating employment policies with the union
or unilaterally imposing employment policies, if there is no union, that allow
the employer to rule out a possible accommodation in violation of that policy
as imposing an undue hardship. Both policy issues will be discussed below.
One governmental study, admitted into the record of the hearing before the
Committee on Small Business in the House of Representatives, determined that
among reasonable accommodations provided by federal contractors, the lowest
costing accommodations included “changing hours, work procedures, and task
assignments; transferring the workers to a new job; and orienting
coworkers.”226 While this study is isolated and outdated, its underlying
principle remains true: assuming it has been determined that a reasonable
accommodation does not impose an undue hardship, any financial cost to an
employer would be minimal.
The main cost argued by employers is litigation costs generated from both
uncertainty in determining when a seniority system should be violated, and
suits, possibly under the NLRA, brought by those employees who had their
seniority rights violated.227 In effect, this argument makes two claims: (1) that
an employer could be found in violation of both the ADA and NLRA, and,
thus, subject to claims brought under both acts and (2) that litigation of such
claims under the ADA or NLRA will be costly.228 This argument is
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the enforcement agencies of the ADA and
the NLRA have established a “Memorandum of Understanding” to effectively
deal with the situation where a conflict arises between the acts.229 Second,
even in the face of costly litigation, violation of seniority rights will only occur
in limited circumstances. To require violation of a seniority system, the
226. Americans With Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Bus., 101st
Cong. 19 app. IV (1990), reprinted in 5 DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 PUBLIC LAW 101336, at doc. 23 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., et al. eds., 1992) (citing BERKLEY PLANNING
ASSOCIATES, A STUDY OF ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDED TO HANDICAPPED EMPLOYEES BY
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS (June 17, 1982)). The study surveyed two thousand federal contractors
covered by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, with 367 responding. Id. This study was sponsored
by the Employment Standards Administration, Department of Labor. Id.
227. See Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
228. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission oversees enforcement of the ADA and
the National Labor Relations Board oversees enforcement of the NLRA.
229. Memorandum of Understanding Between the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Nov. 16, 1993), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/eeoc-nlrb-ada.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2002).
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accommodation in the employee’s current position would, first, have to be
unavailable or impose undue hardship.230 Second, there would have to be no
other accommodations that are better or more convenient for the employer
without imposing undue hardship.231 Lastly, a violation of seniority rights
would not be required if it posed an undue hardship. Factoring these
considerations with the relatively low number of disabled employees any given
employer employs would lead to very limited circumstances in which a
variance to the seniority system would be required. The larger the employer is
the greater the risk it has, but also the employer is more able to absorb the
costs.232 It makes sense to subject some employers to risk in a few limited
circumstances to both further the ADA’s underlying theme of keeping disabled
Americans at work so they may lead more economically independent lives, and
for the greater good of opening “once-closed doors into a bright new era of
equality, independence and freedom.”233
Beyond the cost issue, another issue arises. An employer could avoid
obligations of reasonable accommodation required by the ADA in two
situations. Outside of a collective bargaining context, an employer could
unilaterally create employment policies that prohibit changes in employment
procedures, such as seniority policies. Where a union represents the
employees, the union could enter a collective bargaining agreement that
prohibits changes in other employment procedures, the issue takes a slightly
different form, and this variation will be discussed under subsection F, infra.
F.

Collective Bargaining Agreements

Two general issues arise when the seniority clause is contained in a
collective bargaining agreement. The first being involvement of a union and
the NLRA. The other issue that arises is better classified as a public policy
issue. If a per se bar were established to provisions such as seniority policies,
an employer could conveniently use a collective bargaining agreement to
reduce the company’s obligations to provide reasonable accommodations
under the ADA. In fact, not allowing otherwise reasonable accommodations to
Americans with disabilities would not only be required by the agreement—it
would be mandated by law.
One of the arguments relied upon by courts in applying a per se bar to
accommodations requiring an employer to violate a seniority policy is that
under a balancing approach, an employer may be required to choose whether to

230. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: LAW, REGULATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE, supra note 200, at § 3.10(5).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 10 (1989).
233. Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, BOOK II PUB. PAPERS
1068 (July 26, 1990).
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violate the NLRA or the ADA.234 This argument fails to recognize a union’s
obligations under the ADA. Unions are obliged in two ways. First, employers
may not enter contractual relationships, including ones with labor unions, that
subject their employees to discrimination.235 Secondly, unions are specifically
included in the ADA’s definition of “covered entity,”236 so unions must
conform to the duties required under the ADA, including reasonable
accommodation.237
Thus, an employer cannot do contractually what it could not do under the
ADA.238 This requirement applies whether or not the employer or union
intended for the relationship to have a discriminatory effect.239 Therefore, an
employer or union may not, through contract, avoid a duty to make a
reasonable accommodation.240
However, under a balancing approach,
employers and unions could still protect their interests while maintaining
compliance with the ADA. Since the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, such as a seniority policy, are in the undue hardship analysis, if an
employer could show that varying a seniority policy would be unduly
disruptive to its employees or to the functioning of the business, the
accommodation would not be required.241
The EEOC took the position that the union’s duty of reasonable
accommodation is to negotiate with the employer for a variance in the
collective bargaining agreement.242 However, this joint obligation of the union
and the employer is not required if such variance would impose an undue
hardship. This process is consistent with both the ADA and the NLRA. As the
exclusive bargaining representative, a union may negotiate variations in the
collective bargaining agreement with an employer without violating the

234. See, e.g., Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n, 236 F.3d 675, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“We
are persuaded that it would be improper to subject an employer to the Hobson’s choice of
violating the ADA or the NLRA, or at least subjecting itself to the threat of litigation under these
statutes, depending on the outcome of a ‘balancing’ approach.”).
235. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (2001).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000).
237. 4 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE, supra note 200, at 605.102 (reprinting a NLRB
opinion letter regarding a union’s right to obtain certain medical information for purposes of
collective bargaining).
238. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 app. (2001). The appendix consists of interpretive guidance issued
by the EEOC.
239. Id.
240. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 59-60 (1990).
241. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 app. (“[A]n employer cannot avoid its responsibility to make
reasonable accommodation subject to the undue hardship limitation through a contractual
arrangement.”).
242. 4 CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE, supra note 200, at 605.102. This requirement, of
course, arises only where there is no other reasonable accommodation and the accommodation
would not pose an undue hardship, or unduly burden other employees.
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NLRA.243 Thus, the requirements under both the ADA and the NLRA may be
met. Most commentators reached the conclusion, before the courts took up
this issue, that “[e]xcluding seniority systems would have made the goals of
the ADA illusory.”244
G. Appropriateness for Court Action Versus Legislative Action
As previously noted, most courts that have ruled on the issue of whether
the ADA may require variation of a seniority policy as a reasonable
accommodation have relied on prior persuasive precedent without any analysis
of the issues.245 The courts that have conducted a full analysis have either
relied on the misguided notion that a position is not vacant if no current
employee holds it, but a more senior employee is bidding for the job, or have
misapprehended the plain language and legislative history of the ADA. Since
the per se rule against variation of seniority policies has resulted from a
judicial misapplication and misapprehension of the ADA, it is most appropriate
for the court, rather than the legislature, to remedy it. This is true despite
Judge Trott’s assertion, in his dissent to the majority’s decision in Barnett, that
this is a policy question for the legislature to resolve.246 However, now that the
Supreme Court has issued its ruling, which comes very close to a per se bar, it
will be up to the legislature to remedy this situation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Rather than applying a per se bar to reassignments that require variation of
a seniority policy, courts should consider the hardship it creates upon the
employee(s) affected as a factor in the undue hardship analysis. Some of the
factors to consider in this analysis would include: (1) the actual effect on nondisabled employees resulting from the variation from the seniority policy; (2)
the frequency of and reasons for prior deviations from the seniority policy; and
243. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) (specifying a particular process
that must be followed in order to seek a modification of a collective bargaining agreement).
244. See Daly-Rooney, supra note 134, at 401. Cf. Ervin, supra note 139, at 926-97 (“The
duty of a covered entity under the ADA to make reasonable accommodation is different from the
duty imposed by the Rehabilitation Act and should be capable of mitigation by the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreements only under extraordinary circumstances.”); Stahlhut, supra note
122, at 92 (“Equity concerns also dictate that collectively bargained rights should not
automatically trump a disabled employee’s request for accommodation.”); DuBault, supra note
122, at 1292 (“To conclude that the ADA shuns per se determinations and requires a genuine ad
hoc balancing of ADA and NLRA rights and obligations is only the beginning. The more
difficult question is what factors must be considered when balancing those rights and obligations
and why.”).
245. See supra Part III.A.
246. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1125 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Trott, J.,
dissenting) (“What to do with seniority systems in this context is a policy question for Congress,
one which we as judges have no authority or ability to resolve.”).
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(3) whether the seniority policy is contained in a collective bargaining
agreement or is an employer-imposed seniority system.
The actual effect of a variation of a seniority policy upon non-disabled
employees will vary greatly depending on the type of action required. Under
the ADA, it is clear that bumping of employees is not required,247 so if a senior
employee holds a position and the disabled employee seeks that position, the
accommodation will impose an undue hardship. However, if a disabled
employee seeks reassignment to an otherwise vacant position that another
more senior employee is bidding for, it is more likely that granting the less
senior disabled employee the position will not impose an undue hardship. This
would be especially true in circumstances in which a disabled employee is
seeking reassignment to a vacant position of which no more senior employee is
bidding for, even if the position requires a certain amount of seniority which
the disabled employee has not yet attained. Since no rights of other employees
would be affected, the employer would be required to show that the requisite
seniority requirement is a business necessity. Accommodations should,
therefore, be assessed for actual effect on employees, and this effect should
then be considered as a factor in the undue hardship determination.
Courts should also consider the frequency of and reasons for prior
deviations from the seniority policy as factors in the undue hardship analysis.
If an employer has previously assented, either unilaterally or with the consent
of the union, to a variation in the seniority policy, the other employees’
expectations arising from the seniority policy would decrease. Thus, the
greater number of variations in the past will decrease the hardship falling on
other employees. Also, the lower importance or lower necessity of prior
deviations would decrease the expectations of other employees and the
hardship they may face. For example, if an employer had an open position
which required a certain amount of seniority, and the employer granted an
exception to the policy in order to fill the position from within the company, it
would be more likely that allowing a similar exemption to the policy for a
disabled employee would result in less of a hardship on the employer and other
employees.
Whether the seniority policy is contained within a collective bargaining
agreement or is unilaterally imposed by an employer will also bear on the
decision. Where a collective bargaining agreement is involved, there may be a
slightly greater expectation from the employees that the policy will be adhered
to, thus, resulting in a greater burden of hardship on the employees. However,
unions are also a “covered entity” within the meaning of the ADA, and they
should have a burden to establish reasonable accommodations for disabled
employees. Even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement,
employees have reasonable expectations of employer adherence to the
247. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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seniority policy. Employers should also remember that they should not be
allowed to do through contract what they could not otherwise do. Creating
seniority policies would be an easy way for employers to avoid obligations
under the ADA, and with the widespread use and importance of such policies,
it would be much easier for the employer to mask any attempt to avoid the duty
to reassign under the ADA. If employers are able to avoid obligations in this
way, employment policies will be put in place with minimal justification, and
the obligations imposed by the ADA to reasonably accommodate disabled
employees will be negated by the employment policies adopted.
In addition, the progressive system implemented by Congress to determine
whether a variance of a seniority policy is required helps protect the employer
from an unreasonable amount of litigation over its decision. Because of this
system, in many circumstances the employer will not even have to consider a
reassignment that is contrary to a seniority policy because either another
reasonable accommodation within the disabled employee’s current position or
another accommodation, consistent with the employment policies already in
place, is available. Therefore, only if a reasonable accommodation within an
employee’s current position is not possible and other reasonable
accommodations consistent with employment policies impose an undue
hardship should variation of seniority policies be considered.
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